The labor market and the transition of socialist economies by Vodopivec, Milan
Policy,  Research,  and  Extemda  Affairs  ,  i.
WORKING  PAPERS
Sodalist  Economies  Reform
Country  Economics  Department
The  World  Bank
December  1990
WPS  561
The  Labor  Market
and  the  Transition
of Socialist  Economies
Milan  Vodopivec
Onechallengeof  thetransitionofsocialisteconomiestomultiparty
democracy  and a market  economy will be to reallocate  labor
while  minimizing  the  social  costs  of  unemployment.  Vodopivec
identifies the key issues of labor reform and makes policy
recommendations.
ThePolicy.Resarh,  and ExnalAffarisComplex  diibutes  PRE Wolking Paperstodissaminstethe  findings ofwo  npogess  and
to encourage the exchange of ideas among Bank aff  and all ethers intrested  in development issues. lhese  papers canry the names of
the authors, rflect  only their views, and should be used and cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions are the
















































































































dPolicy,  Resrch,  and Extln  Affalr
Socilislt  Economles  Reform
WPS 561
This paper-  a productofthe SocialistEconomiesRefonn Unit, Country Economics Department-is  part
of a larger effort in PRE to investigate the labor markets in socialist economies. Copies are available free
from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington DC 20433. Please contact CECSE, room N6-045,
extension 37188 (44 pages).
All socialist countries of Eastem Europe except  A key feature of the transition wiU be
Albania are now starting to fundamentally  redundant labor and, almost certainly, significant
restructure their economic and political systems  unemployment, together with labor shortages for
- with the clear goals of a market economy and  certain skills. The challenge for these economies
multiparty democracy.  Reform of the labor  wiU be to massively realocate  labor at the least
market is essential to these efforts, the reform  social cost.
that wiU set wages and employment solely in the
interests of efficiency, and leave social protec-  Active labor market policies will be impor-
tion to the cash benefit system.  tant - not just income support schemes but
policies that improve labor mobility and increase
The labor market in socialist economies was  labor absorption.  These economies must im-
traditionally plagued with grave rigidities:  most  prove their ability to train and retrain workers
importantly, workers enjoyed practically com-  and to do such things as help small businesses,
plete job security; firms were informally pressed,  improve schooling, link universities with busi-
and even legally obliged, to hire; part-time and  nesses, and help with technology transfer.
fixed-term employment were legally discour-
aged; hiring, reassigning within the firm, and  To eliminate employment subsidies, argues
dismissing on disciplinary grounds were exces-  Vodopivec, requires imposing lasting financial
sively bureaucratic; both wage biUls  and wage  discipline, including transparent (individual)
rates were administratively regulated; and  property rights, an unselective and transparent
workers were entitled to many fringe benefits  fiscal system, and a multiparty political system
typically not found in market economies.  (to provide checks and balances for the ruling
party and thus contain its ability to redistribute).
These rigidities produced what Vodopivec
calls the full employment syndrome - a labor  Vodopivec also recommends policies forjob
market characterized by inefficient labor alloca-  security, incomes policy, wage differentials,
tion, suppressed work incentives, and inherent  nonwage labor costs, and wage taxation.
wage drift tendency.  At the heart of this syn-
drome is the lack of appropriate mechanisms to
enforce the exit of firms (workers) that results in
a massive employment subsidization.
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*  This  is  a  background  study  for the  World Bank's  research  projecL on  the  labor
market  in  Eastern  Europe.  Valuable  comments  from  Simon  Commander,  Alan  Gelb,
Timothy  King, and  Luis  Riveros are  gratefully  acknowledged.All socialist  countries  of  Eastern  Europe  but  AMbania  are  now  starting
to fundamentally  restructure  their  economic  and  political  systems--with  the
clear  goals  of a  market  economy  and  multiparty  democracy. Reform  of the labor
market  is essential  to these  efforts. First,  as a factor  of production,  labor
has the  most potential  for  increasing  productivity  (Blinder  1990). Second,
adjustment  of the  labor  market  has  been critical  to the  success  of reform
efforts  in other  countries  undergoing  drastic  adjustment.
The  challenge  of the  transition  will be to  reallocate  labor  while
minimizing  the  social  costs  of unemployment.  This  paper  analyzes  how the
labor  market  functions  in socialist  economies  (SEs),  identifies  the  key issues
of labor  reform,  and  makes  policy  recommendations.  Section  1  describes  the
East  European  countries'  economic  legacy  from  the  socialist  era.  Section  2
focuses  on features  of the  SE labor  market,  and  Section  3 on how it functions.
Section  4 concludes  with policy  implications  and  identifies  important  research
issues.
1.  THE  LEGACY  OF SOCIALIST  ECONOMIES
After  World  War  II,  the  countries  of  Eastern  Europe  adopted,  with  minor
modifications,  the  economic  system  the  U.S.S.R.  had developed  (usually
referred  to as a centrally  planned  economy,  or  CPE)  between  the  two  wars.  The
systems'  two  cornerstones  are  state  ownership  of the  means  of production  and
centralized  planning  as the  means  of  coordinating  economic  activity. The
central  authorities--the  state  planning  commission  and  branch  ministries--
formulate  detailed  production  plans  and control  their  implementation.  Such  an
economy  relies  on pressure  as an economic  incentive,  and  political  and
ideological  criteria  dominate  economic  considerations  in  the  formulation  of
plans  (Brown  and  NeubergeP  1989). The  system's  basic  goal is  rapid  growth  and
p.'2
industrialization--the  latter  pursued  with little  regard  for  a country's
relative  resource  endowments.
The system  initially  produced  relatively  rapid  growth  in these
countries,  and  a seeming  macroeconomic  rationality  (it  prevented  open
unemoloyment  and  inflation).  But  as early  as 1948  the  most eager  reformer
(Yugoslavia)  recognized  that  the  traditional  CPE  mndel  had serious  flaws. The
system's  main flaws  were inappropriate  motivation  and  inefficient  gathering
and  processing  of information.  It has  become  increasingly  clear  that  the
system  cannot  satisfy  the  diversified,  changing  demands  for  consumer  goods  and
that its  capital  and  labor  are  less  productive  than  capital  and  labor  in other
countries  at a similar  stage  of development.  Yugoslavia's  dissent  marked  the
beginning  of the  search  for  alternative  models.
Despite  a common  basic  orientation,  reform  efforts  in the  Eastern
European  countries  vary in scope  and  timing. The  most orthodox  countries
(East  Germany,  Czechoslovakia,  and  Bulgaria)  have  only  occasionally  tinkered
with elements  of CPE.  Poland's  repeated  attempts  to break  away  from formal
central  planning,  which  began  in the  1950s,  failed--and  the  Polish  economy
collapsed  in the  early  1980s. Hungary,  sometimes  held  up as a reform  3uccess
story,  abandoned  central  planning  with one  stroke  in 1968,  and  has since
widened  the  reform--with  a setback  in the  mid-1970s. Yugoslavia,  a  pioneer  in
reform  in  Eastern  Europe,  established  the  system  known  as self-management,
which stressed  worker  participation  in decisionmaking.  The system's  self-3
management  component  is overemphasized,'  however;  the  Yugoslav  system  does  not
differ  mutch  from  those  in other  socialist  countries.
Reform  in  the  SEs  has  been  geared  toward  replacing  central  planning  with
a more  efficient  coordinating  mechanism. First,  mandatory  short-term  central
plans--representing  the  planners'  tightest  hold on the  economy--were
abolished,  to  be replaced  by  more subtle  instruments  of indirect  control.
Second,  the  market  (prices)  was increasingly  relied  on to coordinate  economic
activity. Third,  enterprises  were given  autonomy  in  many areas,  ranging  ftom
price  setting  to decisions  about  product  mix and  investment,  and  even  the
selection  of  managers--an  autonomy,  however,  that  has  been continually
breached  by government  (in  a  peculiar  relationship  between  government  and
enterprise  known  as state  paternalism).  Fourth,  to improve  motivation,  profit
incentives  replaced  the  multiple  criteria  of central  planning.
The  sacrosanct  pillar  of socialist  economies--untouched  until  the  latest
wave of reform--has  been social  ownership  of the  means  of production. In
Marxist  analysis,  private  property  leads  to the  exploitation  of  workers  by
capitalist  owners,  so the  authorities  of SEs  tightly  restricted  the  private
sector  and zondemned  proposals  to change  the  ownership  structure. 2
1,  Ward (1958)  precipitated  a stream  of literature  analogous  to analysis  of
capitalist  firms  except  that income  per  worker is maximized  instead  of
profit.  Ward  aptly  called  his  firm  "Illyrian."  Many  of  his  followers  take
it for  a Yugoslav  firm  even though  the resemblance  is as remote  as the
millennia  since  ancient  Illyria.  Underemployment,  for  example,  one  of  the
key  predicticns  of the  Illyrian  analysis,  contradicts  the  facts.
2/  As late as 1971, a reform-minded  Yugoslavia  ousted  a Slovenian  prime
minister  for  advocating  the  introduction  of shares.4
The  problems  faced  by the  SEs
The  main  problems  plaguing  the  SEs  are:  allocative  inefficiency,  X-
inefficiency,  dynamic  inefficiency,  macroeconomic  instability,  and
distributive  inefficiency.
Allocative  inefficiency.  Without  equilibrium  prices,  planners  do not
know  the  true  opportunity  costs  of factors  of production  so they  are  bound  to
combine  them  inefficiently.  This,  together  with  X-inefficiency  and  dynamic
inefficiency,  makes  investments  inefficient.  In  Yugoslavia,  for  example,  the
average  effi.ciency  in  investment  (in  terms  of generating  output  grow  h) is
estimated  to be only  70  percent  of that  of other  European  nonsocialist
countries  at a similar  stage  of development  (Bajt  1988). Similar  results
probably  apply  for  other  Eastern  European  countries.
X-inefficiency  (Leibenstein  1966).'  Socialist  firms  are  especially
prone  to this  type  of inefficiency.  To a large  extent,  a firm's  X-
inefficiency  depends  on the  availability  and  effectiveness  of disciplinary
devices  external  to the firm. These  are  lacking  or function  less  efficiently
under  socialism  than  under  capitalism;  under  capitalism,  one  may rely  on the
market  for  corporate  control  (Manne  1965),  capital  market  (Jensen  and  Meckling
1976),  market  for  managers  (Fama  1980),  and  products  market  (bankruptcy)  to
prevent  long-run  lapses  in  firm  efficiency.  In socialist  countries,  the  first
two  markets  do not  exist. Their  effectiveness  in capitalist  countries  is
disputed,  but their  overall  effect  is likely  to be positive. Nor, under
3/  This  concept  involves  the  internal  efficiency  of firms,  regardless  of  the
economy-wide  rationality  of choice  of inputs  or technology.5
socialism,  can one  really  talk  about  a  mirket  for  managers.'  And  products
markets--the  threat  of  bankruptcy--creates  even  less  pressure  under  socialism
because  of  the state's  paternalistic  attitude  toward  ailing  firms. The
environment  of socialist  firms  is  much less  hostile  than  that  of capitalist
firms, 5 and  their  internal  efficiency  is accordingly  lower.'  Moreover,  the
lack  of appropriate  external  pressure  is  accentuated  by systemic  constraints
on the  internal  organization  of the  firm. Career  advancement,  for  example,  is
often  tied  to such  noneconomic  considerations  as  membership  in  the  communist
party (Adam  1984,  28).
Dynamic  inefficiency.  Socialist  firms  are  notorious  for  adapting  poorly
technologically  and  for  generating  few  technological  innovations. This  is
chiefly  bacause  rewards  are  separated  from  those  who have  generated  them,
because  of rigidities  in the  social  sector  and  constraints  on the  private  one.
The  theoretical  advantages  of the  system  in  terms  of R&D (no  wastefvl
duplication,  the  possibilitiee  of efficiently  disseminating  R&.. 3sulte
because  R&D finance  is  not linked  to the  revenues  generated  by it,  Arrow 1962)
are  outweighed  by the  system's  shortcomings.
Macroeconomic  instability. The  notorious  job security  in SEs is
accomplished  through  massive  redistribution  of income  (see  below). But  there
4/  Kornai (1986a)  claims that "[t]here is no genuine 'job market' for
managers;  their  career  depends  to  a  large  extent  on  the  opinion  of  the  top
bureaucracy"  (p.  1694).
5/  To  fill  the  void  in  the  incentive  structure  of  workers  and  managers  created
by the absence  of "the stick,"  SEs resort  to use of "the carrot"--they
stimulate  worker participation  in profit-sharing  and decision-making.
These  attempts  have  not  been  too  successful--see  below.
6/  Using  a  static  framework,  my  estimate  of  the  deadweight  losses  attributable
to  the  moral  hazard  created  by  compensatory  redistribution  and  ineffective
external  control  of  Yugoslav  firms  is  6-7  percent  of  GNP  (Vodopivec  1990a).6
is a constant  danger  that  subsidies  are only  partly  financed  by fiscal
revenues  and  that  the  state  will resort  to  expansionary  monetary  policy  (which
has  happened  on a large  scale  in  many SEs). Under  CPEs,  macroeconomic
imbalance  took  the  form  mainly  of shortages  of consumer  goods  and  hence  of
repressed  inflation. With reliance  on the  market  (using  prices  as signaling
devices),  macroeconomic  imbalance  in reforming  SEs (those  that  have abandoned
central  planning  as key  allocator  of resources)  also takes  the  form  of open
inflation  as  well as external  imbalance. This  is even  more of a danger  as
tax/subsidy  schemes  grow  more sophisticated. 7 And  the  burden  of such
compensatory  redistribution  frustrates  attempts  to stabilize  the  economy
through  restrict 4.ve  monetary  policy  or  by reducing  the  public  sector  deficit.
Distributive  inefficiency.  The  bargaining  process  through  which  income
ic redistributed  in  SEs  affects  the  distributive  efficiency  of socialist
economies. Not only  are  the  privileges  and  perquisites  of the  elite  at stake.
If a huge  portion  of  GNP is  redistributed  through  informal  bargaining,  the
system  is  bound  to generate  inefficiencies  in  both  production  and
distribution--because  organizational  power  differs  among  groups,  as the  logic
of collective  action  implies  (Olson  1965).
Current  reforms
Until  the 1980s,  the  growth  record  of socialist  countries  was reasonably
good,  although  it relied  heavily  on the  growth  of inputs  and  was  marked  by
microeconomic  inefficiencies  (the  so-called  extensive  growth  pattern). But
growth  slowed  down  markedly  in the  1980s;  extensive  growth  had  hit its  limits.
7/  One  sophisticated  way  Yugoslav  enterprises  have  been subsidized  has  been
through release of  the foreign exchange risk connected with  those
enterprises'  foreign  loans. That  kind of subsidy  is not transparent  so
authorities  do  not recognize  its  infla_ionary  impact  right  away.7
Moreover,  Yugoslavia  and  Hungary,  which  had taken  ezonomic  reforms  the
furthest,  and  Poland  began  experiencing  serious  external  imbalances  (mounting
foreign  debts),  as  wall as internal  ones. Yugoslavia  _..d  Poland  suffered  the
kind of  hyperinflation  experienced  in recent  history  only  in  Latin  America.
Traditionally,  reform  in the  SEs  has  aimed  to improve  rather  than  change
the  basic  socialist  system. But regimes'  ability  to preserve  the  basic  SE
model  was severely  weakened  by rapidly  deteriorating  economic  performance  in
the 1980s--and  under  a reform-minded  new leader  the  Soviet  Union  actually
stimulated  reform  in other  SEs. So the  late 1980s  witnessed  increasingly  more
radical  reform  in some  SEs,  which  gradually  transcended  their  traditional
palliative  nature,  trying  to transform  the  socialist  economies  into  full-
fledged  market  economies. This  process  culminated  in (1)  legislation  that
allowed  decisionmaking  rights  on the  basis  of  equity-capital,  laying  the legal
foundation  for  the  transition  from  socialism  to capitalism  (in  Poland,
Hungary,  and  Yugoslavia),  and (2)  the  end  of the  Communist  Party's  political
monopoly  and legalization  of  the  multiparty  svstem. With the  peaceful
revolutions  of 1989,  the  political  and  econcmic  reform  spread  rapidly  to the
rest  of the  East  E-ropean  countries.
In recent  years,  the  economic  programs  of the  most eager  reformers  have
been  remarkably  similar,  although  Yugoslavia--paralyzed  by the  recent
escalation  of ethnic  strife--is  now  lagging  behind  Hungary  and  Poland  in
boldness  of reform. Persuaded  that  the  closely  intertwined  transitional
measures  should  aim  at  both stabilization  and  long-term  economic
restructuring,  these  countries  adopted  broad  economic  programs  that  have
triggered  deep,  systemic  changes  of historical  importance.  Among  short-term
policies,  they  have  liberalized  many  prices  (including  exchange  and  interest8
rates)  and foreign  trade,  and  have  adopted  measures  to contain  inflation
(tight  control  of  wages  and  deep  cuts  in  enterprise  subsidies). Long-term,
systemic  changes  required,  above  all,  legislation  (such  as  Hungary's  Law  on
Transformation)  that  allows  social/state  property  to  become  clearly  owned
commercial  corporations,  thus  providing  the  framework  for  p_ivatization.
Other  important  changes  include  significantly  liberalized  laws  on foreign
direct  investment,  revamping  of the  tax  system.  and  changes  in the  financial
system  (the  introduction  of capital  markets  and,  in  Hungary  and  Poland,  a two-
tier  banking  system).
2.  FEATURES  OF  THE  LABOR  MARKET
In  Marxist  ideology,  the  primary  avowed  goal  of socialist  countries  has
been to abolish  the  exploitation  of  workers  supposedly  found  under  capitalism.
According  to  Marx,  under  capitalism,  workers  are  treated  as "commodities"  and
are  exploited  by selling  their  labor  at a price  below  the  value  of  what that
labor  produces. Marx  claimed  that  workers  are  forced  into  such  transactions
because  selling  their  labor  is their  only  source  of income,  and  the  so-called
industrial  reserve  army  prevents  wages  from  rising  above  subsistence. To
uproot  exploitation,  then,  abolition  of the  labor  market  is no less  important
than  turning  ownership  of  the  means  of production  over  to the  public.
Socialist  countries  sought  to deny  the  very existence  of a labor  market,
both legally  and  theoretically.  By emphaeizing  the  right  to  work,  by
generating  jobs  for  virtually  everyone  willing  to  work, and  by effectively
forbidding  the  firing  of  workers,  SEs  have  tried  to suppress  not only  the9
labor  market,  but also  the  treatment  of labor  as a commodity'--hence  their
reluctance  even  to talk  about  the  demand  for  and  supply  of labor.
Yet it is fairly  easy  to identify  a labor  market  in these  economies.
Institutions  of that  labor  market  are  undoubtedly  peculiar  and  function  under
many constraints  but  in socialist  economies,  too,  labor  is allocated  mostly
through  the labor  market. Decisions  about  the  supply  of labor  in socialist
economies  are  essentially  voluntary:
>1)  In socialist  countries,  the  quit (voluntary  separation)  rate  is normal
--that  is,  comDarable  to the  rate  in  developed  market  economies. The  labor
turnover  rate  in Poland  in 1965-79,  for  example,  stabilized  at 20-21  percent,
dropped  to 15.7  percent  in 1981  during  a severe  crisis,  and  rose  back  to 19.1
percent  in 1986  (annual  rates,  Rocznik  StatVstvcznV,  various  issues).
Relatively  few  of the  separations  were dismissals--in  1975-80,  only  4.6  to 7
percent  of total  separations  (Simatupang  1983). Kornai  (198(c)  reports  a quit
rate  of 15.7  percent  in  Hungary  in 1982. In Yugoslavia,  labor  turnover  tended
to decline  (probably  in relation  to vising  unemployment)  droppirg  from  20.3
percent  in 1970  to 13  percent  in 1987 (Statistical  Yearbook  of  Yugoslavia,
8/  A more serious attempt to address capitalist  exploitation  is self-
management (as  introduced  in Yugoslavia),  which  allows for worker
participation  in  decisionmaking  and  profit-sharing.  To emphasize  that  it
is  the  workers  who  receive  surplus  value,  the  personal  earnings  of  Yugoslav
workers  are  divided  in  two  parts: a reward  for  "live"  labor  and  a reward
for  the management  of "past"  labor (Marx's  term),  or capital. Without
contractual  determination  of either  part of personal  earnings,  however,
the  distinction--despite  being  implemented  on  a  grand  scale--is  completely
artificial.10
various issues).9 Dismissals were insignificant in both Hungary and
Yugoslavia.
(2)  Most SEs do not adn'inistratively  assign labor in the sense of directing
workers to specific jobs.  The Soviet Union has been assigning graduates to
specific jobs, and practicing organized and social recruitment, but that has
affected only a small portion of the labor market." 0
(3)  Migration from one region to another, an important aspect of labor
mobility--is influenced  mainly by standard economic factors (Mitchneck 1990).
Thus, the labor  market in socialist countries is roughly comparable in
mobility with developed market economies.  Moreover, a good deal of economic
activity in SEs has been carried out in the "second" economy where market
forces clearly do affect the allocation of labor.  But that is not to deny the
specific constraints on institutions supporting the labor  market in the SEs,
to which we now turn.
Systemic constraints on the labor market
Job security.  Once employed,  workers in SEs need not fear losing their
jobs.  They can be dismissed only for seriously breaching  work discipline
(with  unexcused absences, for example, or drunkenness on the job)."  And the
dismissal procedure usually involves trade unions whose actions reflect the
belief that dismissing malfeasants would only shift the burden of their
9/  For comparison,  in 1970-81,  the  quit  rate in  U.S.  manufacturing ranged  from
14.4 percent to 33.6 percent; in Sweden, from 15 percent to 25 percent;
in Japan, from 9.1 percent to 15  percent; and in Italy, from 6.5 to 13.7
percent (OECD 1986).  Labor turnover in manufacturing is usually higher
than in the rest of the economy.
IO/  Granick (1987)  uses the  quit rate and  administrative assignment  of  workers
to jobs as criteria for the existence of a labor  market.
11/  For details on Yugoslavia, see Prasnikar and Svejnar (1988).11
support  onto  the  shoulders  of others  (an  attitude  shared  by courts  dealing
with such  labor  disputes).
1 2
The  obligation  to  work in  a social  sector. The  authorities  in socialist
countries  have  always  preferred  employment  in  the  social  sector  to employment
in the  private  sector. This  goal  was originally  achieved  by nationalizing
most of the  means  of production,  leaving  limited  scope  for  the  private  sector.
All SEs  have  kept  the  private  sector  insignjficant  by legal  limitations
(especially  on the size  of private  firms),  discriminatory  taxation,  and
limited  access  to and  unfavorable  terms  for  credit. The socialization  of
production  extended  even  to agriculture--except  in  Poland  and, after  an
unsuccessful  collectivization  attempt,  Yugoslavia. Sentiment  against
socialized  production  was stronger  in  agriculture  than  in any  other  sector.
Fringe  benefits. Workers  in  socialist  enterprises  enjoy  substantial
fringe  benefits  in the  form  of  basic  social  services  for  themselves  and  their
families  (such  as  health  care,  education,  child  care,  generous  maternity  and
sick  leave,  subsidized  housing  and  vacation,  and  pensions). Providing  such
basic  social  services  to everyone  is appropriate  under  socialism. Marx,  in
his famous  "Critique  of the  Ghota  Program,"  said  that  the  communist  ideal  of
distribution  (from  each  according  to  his ability,  to each  according  to his
needs)  was not feasible  under  socialism,  but  he insisted  that  a socialist
society  should  provide  basic  services  for  every  individual.  So  many labor-
related  costs  are  payments  for  social  services. Some  of the fringe  benefits
(such  as  health  insurance)  tend  to decrease  differences  in  personal  earnings,
12/  The  ILO (1984)  says  there  are  few  disputes  about  dismissals  because  they
are  so rare.12
but  others  (such  as  housing  subsidies)  tend  to increase  differences  (see
Central  Statistical  Office  of  Hungary  and  others,  1989).
Regulation  of  work time. Working  hours  are  rigidly  set  in socialist
economies. This  rigidity  appears  to  be used  to fight  the  illegal  and
semilegal  activities  of the  second  economy,  and  reflects  the  official  position
that  work is  a "sacred  duty  of all  members  of socialist  society." In other
words,  not  only is  everyone  supposed  to  work,' 3 but  employment  is  virtually
exclusively  full-time. Part-time  work,  reserved  mainly  for  retirees  and
people  taking  second  jobs,  is of only  marginal  importance.  Moskoff  (1984),
for  example,  reports  only  a  minuscule  proportion  (0.32  percent)  of  part-time
workers  in the  Soviet  Union  in 1979. The  labor  market  in  SEs is thus  a
classic  example  of  a quantity-rationed  market  (see  Killingsworth  1983),
forcing  individuals  to  make take-it-or-leave-it  choices  and thus  suboptimal
decisions.
Direct  employment  controls. Job  assignments  are  not  used  significantly
to allocate  work,  but  most  SEs  have  at least  temporarily  relied  on setting
employment  limits  on certain  enterprises  and  industries.  Hungary,  for
example,  imposed  a selective  control  on employment  between  1976  and 1981,
classifying  enterprises  by employment  regimes. Some  enterprises  could
increase  employment  but others  were forced  to  keep  employment  unchanged,  or
reduce  it--or  even  to assign  workers  to priority  enterprises  (Fazekas  and
Kollo 1985). Similarly,  in  the 1970s,  Polish  and  Czech  enterprises  operated
under  employment  limits  (Adam  1984). Even  Yugoslavia  occasionally  resorted  to
13/  There  is  a  strong  stigma  attached  to  unemployment.  Although  the  pressure
to  take  full-time  work  is  mostly  informal,  the  so-called  anti-parasite  laws
at times call for administrative  sentencing  of  employed people to
compulsory  work.13
freezing  employment  in the  nonproductive  sector  (social  services  and  the
government  bureaucracy).
Wage regulation
One  of the  most  difficult  tasks  a government  can  undertake  is  wage
control. The authorities  in socialist  countries  have  no choice. Imperfect  by
nature,  the  labor  market  in SEs  also  suffers  from  the  requirement  that  the
socialist  state  participate  in the  distribution  of a firm's  income  simply  to
prevent  the  erosion  of capital--for  example,  by prescribing  the  rate  of return
on capital"  or by  wage regulation.  Not  surprisingly,  SE governments  have
continually  engaged  in  wage regulation.
A  standard  component  of early  reform  efforts  aimed  at  boosting
productivity  was to replace  the  traditional,  direct  methods  of  wage regulation
with indirect  methods  (in  Yugoslavia  in the 1950s,  in  Hungary  in 1968,  and  in
Poland  in 1973). Direct  methods  involved  assigning  a  wage bill  that  depended
on the  fulfillment  of output  targets. Such  a  method  of  wage control  allowed
authorities  to control  the  level  of the  wage bill,  an ability  they  lost  when
changing  to indirect  wage regulation.  Indirect  methods  still  relied  on
countrywide  determination  of the  basic  wage rate (by  skill  exertion  matrices)
but  use  value  measures  (such  as  value  added  or gross  output)  to  calculate  an
enterprise's  performance  index. This  index  is  then  used to determine  the
"socially  appropriate"  level  of the  wage  bill following  meticulous--if  ad
hoc--rules  on  how to calculate  the  wage  bill or the  profit-sharing  component
of  wages.
14/  This  role  of the  state  is  caused  by the  absence  of  explicit,  transparent,
and  easily  transferable  property  rights--see  Furubotn  and  Pejovich  (1970).14
The schemes used for  wage regulation have usually been complex,
prescribing in detail a method for calculating the approved level of wages.
Moreover, different modes of regulation are used for different types of
enterprises.  In Hungary, for instance, the schemes allow for automatic yearly
increases in the wage bill, regardless of performance, as well as for average
"wage brakes" (in the form of the percentage increase in the  wage bill)--
above which the enterprises face high marginal tax rates.  Moreover, other
criteria besides the performance index are used.  To discourage employment,
for example, Polish enterprises  were directly taxed on new employment (Adam
1982).  Hungarian enterprises  were granted a special tax-free allowance for
cuts in employment.  In Yugoslavia (Vodopivec 1989) and Hungary, increases in
the  wage bill were granted for expanding exports to hard-currency countries.
What is striking is the narrow range of  wage differentials among
enterprises.  A highly progressive tax actually prohibits any  wage increases
above a certain low threshold (historically  6 percent a year for Hungary), and
"needy" enterprises are generously subsidized.' 5 As a consequence, the
profit-sharing part of wages has been kept low--in Hungary, to about 4 percent
in the early 1980s (ILO 1984).
Rules on distribution of a firm's  wage bill among the workers is one
important element of wage regulation.  Drawing again from the writings of
Marx, SEs have allegedly pursued the principle "to everyone according to his
work" by using the so-called tariff system.  Under the tariff system, jobs are
15/  Thus, Kornai and Matits (1987)  find a  weak correlation between the after-
tax subsidy which affects wage formation and the original profitability
of Hungarian enterprises.  Cukor and Kertesi  (1987) find a direct link
between  redistribution  and  wages.  For  Polish loss-makers,  Schaffer (1990a)
finds that an increase in presubsidy losses is nearly and predictably
matched by an increase in subsidies.15
classified  (based  on such  factors  as required  education,  physical  strain,  and
working  conditions)  into  different  skill  grades--the  "skill-exertion  matrices
--to  which economywide  wage rates  are  centrally  assigned. To stimulate
productivity,  various  bonus  schemes  are  superimposed  on  base  wages,  tying
rewards  either  to individual  productivity  (piece  rates)  or to collective
productivity  (profit-sharing  schemes).
Yugoslavia,  which  deviated  from  Soviet  wage regulation  in the 1950s,  was
not only  the  first  but  has  possibly  gone  the furthest  in the  originality  and
sophistication  of its  wage regulation.  Unlike  other  socialist  countries,
Yugoslavia  has  used  skill-exertion  matrices  only  to determine  relative
proportions  of personal  earnings,  not  the  base  level  of  wages. And in its
"income  accounting  system"--under  which  no labor  payments  are  treated  as costs
(thus  avoiding  the  notion  of  profits)--the  entire  wage bill,  at least  in
principle,  is left  completely  undetermined  in advance  (except  for  minimum  wage
provisions).
Another  re2inement  of the  Yugoslav  system  is  that  the  individual
performance  index  is assessed  on the  basis  of the  performance  not  only  of that
enterprise  but  of the  industry  and  economy  as a  whole.' 6 Typically,  the
socially  appropriate  wage  bill is  calculated  by applying  the  corrected
performance  index  of the  enterprise  to the  exogenously  given  norms  for
personal  earnings. The  performance  index  is corrected  to reduce  wage
differentials  among  enterprises.  On one  hand,  workers  in successful
enterprises  are  allowed  to earn  above-average  wages,  but are  subjected  to
progressive  taxation. On the  other  hand,  although  workers  in  below-average
enterprises  earn  below-average  wages,  they  are  effectively  subsidized
16/  See  Schrenk  (1981)  or,  for  more  recent  regulation,  Vodopivec  (1989).16
(Vodopive^  1990a). So even  though  the  procedures  for  regulating  Yugoslav
wages differ  substantially  from  those  used in the  rest  of Eastern  Europe,
regulation  still  tends  to level  differences  in  personal  earnings  among
enterprises  as it does  in  other  socialist  countries. 17
Not only  do SEs  regulate  wages  but  those  wage regulations  typically
change  constantly.  The  history  of regulation  is the  history  of a  continual
search  for  a "perfect"  system. Virtually  every  year,  for  example,  Hungary
revises  the  rules  about  granting  tax-free  wage increases  as  well as the  tax
rates  on profits. What is  more,  these  changes  are  sometimes  small
modifications  and  sometimes  substantial  shifts  in  principle. Hungary,  for
instance,  after  relying  mostly  on  wage  bill regulation  since  1968,  reverted  to
the  predominantly  average-wage-level  regulation  between  1983  and 1988,  only to
shift  back (in  a  recent  overhaul  of the  wage system)  to  wage bill  regulation.
In 1983,  Poland  also  reverted  from  average-wage-level  to  wage bill regulation.
Typical  of  wage regulation  under  the  SEs  has  been the  widespread,  after-
the-fact  granting  of concessions  and  exemptions  from  taxes. Enterprises'
revenues  often  simply  cannot  support  the "socially  appropriate"  level  of  wages
and  also  cover  their  obligations--indeed,  revenues  often  cannot  cover  even  the
wages.  The  tax-subsidy  system  that  is integral  to  wage regulation  is already
highly  selective  and  progressive,  but  additional  concessions  and  exemptions
are  often  granted  to the  least  profitable  enterprises  to prevent  socially
disruptive  strikes. This  is  particularly  true  in  Poland,  where  arbitrary
relief  has  been  a common  practice  despite  relaxation  of the  rules  to prevent
such  ad  hoc intervention.
17/  Vodopivec (1990a)  confirms  that the control  of income  distribution  in
Yugoslav  firms  has  been  effectively  enforced,  with  the  leveling  of income
among  firms  as its  primary  motive.17
Such  constant  changing  of the  wage regulation  rules  is a clear
indication  that  without  theoretical  guidance,  authorities  resort  to
pragmatism. In 1983,  for  example,  Hungary  switched  performance  indicators,
using  the  ratio  of  profits  to the  sum  of the  value  of fixed  assets  and  the
wage bill  as an indicator  instead  of the  growth  of  value  added,  which  had  been
used previously. This  choice  cannot  be defended  on theoretical  grounds.
True,  the  value-added  criterion  discriminates  against  firms  with a high
starting  base (that  is,  against  firms  that  have  already  increased  productivity
and  may  not  have room  for  more efficiency  improvement),  which is  but  another
form  of the  "ratchet"  problem  (the  official  rationale  for  its  abandonment).
But  the  new  measure  is not  free  of shortcomings.  First,  profits  may  not be a
legitimate  financial  indicator  in  a system  with distorted  relative  prices,  an
oligopolistic  market  structure,  and  a  whimsical  tax  and  subsidy  system  (the
value-added  performance  indicator  fares  better  on  this  count). Second,  the
denominator  of  the  measure  (the  sum  of the  value  of fixed  assets  and  the  wage
bill)  is  obviously  determined  on an ad  hoc  basis,  being  the sum  of the stock
and  the  flow.
3.  HOW  THE  LABOR  MARKET  FUNCTIONS
Given  these  systemic  features  in the  SE labor  market,  how does  that
labor  market  function? Typically  it is characterized  by overemployment,  which
manifests  itself  in the  suppression  of  work incentives,  inefficient  allocation
of labor,  and  wage  drift,  all  of  which  are  discussed  below.18
The  full  employment  syndrome
Historically,  the  SE labor  market  has  been characterized  by
overemployment.  On the  one  hand,  firms  use  workers  inefficiently.  Given  the
technology  and  capital  stock  available,  they  maintained  too  many often
overqualified  workers  (unemployment-on-the-job,  or disguised  unemployment).
On the  other  hand,  widespread  labor  shortages  are  common,  generally  for
particular  skills. In fact,  disguised  unemployment  and  labor  shortages  have
occurred  simultaneously  nationally  and  in individual  enterprises: labor
shortages  prevent  firms  from  hiring  workers  they  need,  yet some  workers  on the
payroll  are  underemployed.
In different  economic  systems,  the  phenomenon  of full  employment  (and
relatedly,  the  natural  rate  of unemployment)  differs  profoundly. The  balance
of supply  and demand  implied  in  the  term  "full  employment"  is  not as important
as different  adjustment  mechanisms  used  to achieve  it.  Market  economies
arrive  at full  employment  through  flexible  market  adjustments. SEs  arrive
through  rigidities  that  limit  the  options  available  to firms  and  workers  and
through  pervasive  ad  hoc government  interference  in firms'  decisionmaking.
This rigidity  and  interference  affect  the  environment  that  firms  and  workers
experience  and  change  their  behavior. So full  employment  in SEs  differs
vastly  from  market  economies. In  particular,  the  demand  for  labor  in  market
economies  is derived  demand,  which reflects  changing  conditions  in the  product
markets. The  demand  for  labor  in SEs,  because  of subsidies,  is essentially
autonomous--instead  of relying  on increased  aggregate  demand  to generate  full
employment  (as  Keynes  prescribed),  governments  in SEs  subsidize  factor
demands.19
Historically,  SEs  have achieved  full  employment  through  deliberate
policies  of intense  investment  coupled  with labor-intensive  techniques  and  low
real  wages.  This  has  generated  massive  new employment,  siphoning  excess  labor
from  agriculture  and increasing  the  participation  of  women in the  labor  force.
With the  labor  reserves  fully  exploited,  the  economies  experience  both chronic
labor  shortages  and  substantial  disguised  unemployment." Yugoslavia,  which
had an  unemployment  rate  of 15  percent  by the  end  of the 1980s,  was a
significant  exception. But  open  unemployment  did  not  change  the  way the  labor
market  functioned,  so the same  negative  consequences  that  could  be found  in
the  other  socialist  economies  apply  to  Yugoslavia  as  well.
SEs  have  maintained  full  employment  by subsidizing  employment. This  has
been accomplished  (1)  by keeping  wage differentials  low,  effectively  forcing
productive  workers  to subsidize  less  productive  workers,  and (2)  through  state
paternalism,  by softening  :dget  constraints  faced  by firms  and  thus  fueling
firms'  quasi-insatiable  demand  for  labor  (and  other  inputs).
At the  heart  of full  employment  in SEs  is the  lack  of appropriate
mechanisms  to  enforce  the  exit  of firms  (workers)  that fail  to  behave
according  to the standards  set  by the  society. Managers  and  workers  expect
job  security  and (even  ever  increasing  real  wages),  whatever  their  performance
as reflected  in the  firm's  financial  results. In the  CPE  model,  as  Granick
(1987)  documents,  this  expectation  is fulfilled  by explicit  planning  for  full
employment. Job/wage  expectations  do carry  over  to reforming  SEs,  but in
18/  Adam (1984,  36)  estimates  the  underuse  of  work  time  (a  proxy  for  disguised
unemployment)  as 10 to 30 percent  in Hungary,  and 8 to 10 percent  for
Polish  manufacturing,  and  20  to  30  percent  for  Polish  services.  Mencinger
(1989)  estimates  that  approximately  20  percent  of employment  is  redundant
in Yugoslavia. (Different  methods  are  used  to  measure  labor  redundancy,
so the  estimates  are  not  comparable.)20
those  economies  the  mechanism  through  which  these  expectations  are  fulfilled
is different. Rather  than  being  achieved  by planning,  job/wage  security  is
produced  mainly  through  a complicated  bargaining  process  (which  could  be
considered  as  bargaining  for  employment  subsidies). The  outcome  of  bargaining
is a  massive  redistribution  of income,  which  amounts  to  bailing  out
(preventing  bankruptcy  or layoffs)  and  increasing  the  earnings  of ailing  or
less  productive  firms  and  workers--all  at the  expense  of the  more productive
firms  or  workers  or of the  household  sector. In  other  words,  the  notorious
softness  of firms'  budget  constraints--the  consequence  of state  paternalism--
explains  job/wage  security  in the  reforming  SEs. 1'
Kornai  (1986b  and  elsewhere)  has  discussed  the  mechanisms  through  which
state  paternalism  is implemented  in SEs--including  the  manipulation  of prices,
taxes,  and  subsidies  as  well as  concessionary  finance. And  both the
introduction  of commercial  banks--which  are  also socially  owned  in SEs--and
especially  decentralization  of  the  economy  exacerbates  the  problems  of the
softness  of the  budget  constraint.  So if anything,  decentralization  of the
SEs  diminishes  the  authorities'  ability  to control  the  financial  system.
Such  redistribution  is significant,  according  to the  few  studies  that
have  been  done  on this  subject--Kornai  and  Matits  (1987)  for  Hungary,  Saldanha
(1990)  and  Schaffer  (1990a  and 1990b)  for  Poland,  and  Vodopivec  (1989)  for
Yugoslavia. For  example,  Schaffer  (1990b)  reports  that  direct  subsidies  to
Polish  enterprises  amounted  to 14  percent  of  GDP in 1989,  to  which  one should
add  implicit  enterprises  subsidies  through  concessionary  financing  (which
exceeded  10  percent  of GDP, according  to Saldanha). Moreover,  the forms
19/  For  an explanation  of the  persistence  of  job  security  in reforming  SEs  as
a predictable  outcome  of  bargaining  among  distributional  coalitions,  see
Vodopivec,  1990c.21
through  which redistribution  is implemented  vary from  country  to country,  but
its  pattern  remains  remarkably  unchanged. As Kornai  and  Matits  put it
(p.  30):  "(the  authorities)  take  a lot  away  from  units  that  have  a lot;  those
that  have little  can  in all  likelihood  count  on being  compensated  for  this."
Massive  redistribution  through  state  paternalism  is usually  attributed
to the  socialist  quest  for  equity  (this  is also  the  position  Kornai  takes).
But specific  vehicles  used  for  redistribution  make it  doubtful  that  noble
egalitarian  feelings  fully  explain  this  phenomenon. After  all,  state
paternalism  is  an ineffective  vehicle  for  reducing  inequalities,  20  so  why  not
use other  methods? One  could  argue  that  compensatory  redistribution  persists
because  political  elites  (bureaucrats  and  managers)  want to  maintain  the
status  quo--including  their  privileged  positions--by  avoiding  such  socia'l
disruptions  as strikes.
Many consider  the  socialist  economies'  achievement  of full  employment  a
remarkable  success. 2'  Socialist  economies  seem  to avoid  the  waste of  human
resources  produced  by both  the  nonutilization  of the  part  of the labor  force
involuntarily  unemployed,  and  the  dissipatio-:  of  human  capital  caused  by
lasting  unemployment.  Giving  work to everyone  who  wants to  work also  has
great  social  appeal  because  it  prevents  such  psychological  damage  as the
insecurity  (especially  harmful  to youth) 22 and  the  loss  of self-respect
20/  SEs have themselves  realized  this increasingly. For example,  Gierek's
agenda  was  to substitute  "rational  employment"  for "full employment"
policies.  Moreover,  the SEs have been tinkering  with the concept  of
bankruptcies  for  a long  time.
21/  Kornai,  for example,  argues  that the "elimination  of unemployment  is an
achievement  of  great  historical  importance"  (1986a,  131).
22/  Ehrenberg  and  Smith (1982)  present  some evident  on the long-run  harm of
teenage  unemployment.22
experienced  by people  who  want to  work but  cannot. Moreover,  Gabor  and  Galasi
(1985)  argue  that  government  subsidy  overcomes  an externality  imposed  on
society  by individual  firms  that,  in  their  employment  decisions,  do not  take
into  account  the  costs  of  unemployment  benefits.
The suppression of work incentives
On the  microeconomic  level,  the  full-employment  syndrome  manifests
itself  in the  suppression  of  work incentives.
To understand  why  work incentives  are so  important  in an analysis  of the
productivity  of socialist  firms  and  workers,  let  me summarize  a theory  about
the  firm  that  is particularly  appropriate  for  such  an environment. One
important  characteristic  of the  firm  is the  informal,  nonspecific  nature  of
its  internal  contracts  (FitzRoy  and  Mueller  1984).23  When the  environment  is
not competitive  (and  in  the  short  run,  even  when it is)  the  firm's  members
have room  for  discretionary  behavior. One can  thus  treat  services  of  workers
as comprising  two  parts: a contractual  part,  seen  as fixed  and  determined  by
the  prevailing  norms  (which  can  be set  very low  in  SEs),  and  a noncontractual
part,  which  the  workers  provide  in response  to incentives  institutionalized  in
the firm's  "economic  design." A firm's  efficiency  depends  on incentives  to
elicit  noncontractual  contributions  of  effort  and  information  (Mueller  1976).
Here the  concept  of the  carrot  and  the  stick  is useful. Capitalist
firms  traditionally  rely  on the  stick  (as  specialized  monitoring)  to  motivate
work.  This  kind  of  motivation  has  been  eliminated  from  the  design  of the
23/  This contrasts  sharply  with the orthodox  neoclassical  economics,  which
views  the  firm  as  being  characterized  by (a)  a  technological  transformation
(production) function, and  (b)  objective function.  Contractual
arrangements  constituting  a firm,  and  other  institutions  typically  found
in firms are neglected  on the ground that they function  sufficiently
costlessly  and  flawlessly  (Winter  1988).23
socialist  system. Firms  don't  have it  because  there  are  no external
disciplinary  devices  (or  those  that  exist  are  lax)  and  individuals  don't  have
it because  they  have  a "permanent  right"  to their  present  job.
Without  a stick,  SEs  must rely  for  incentives  on the  carrot--for
example,  worker  participation  in  profit-sharing  or decisionmaking.  There  is
no general  theory  on the  comparative  effectiveness  of carrot  and  stick
incentives,  so it is  difficult  to judge  whether  the  socialists'  exclusive
reliance  on the  carrot  incentive  is  necessarily  less  effective  than  the
capitalist  firms'  predominant  use  of the  stick. The  emnpirical  literature  on
Western  economies  finds  that  worker  participation  increases  workers'
motivation  and  thus  productivity, 2" but  these  are  results  from  an environment
in  which  worker  participation  is superimposed  on--not  replacing--the  stick
incentives.  Insights  from  gami  theory  on the  equilibrium  of "profit-sharing
supergames"'  is  also inconclusive.  Game  theory  allows  for  a cooperative
solution  of  a prisoners'  dilemma  type  of  problem  in  profit-sharing  firms,
making  profit-sharing  superior  to fixed  wages.  But in  less  favorable
circumstances,  profit-sharing  may also  generate  noncooperative  equilibria,
inferior  to fixed-wage  equilibria  (see  Weitzman  and  Kruse  1990). It is hard
to  predict  which  outcome  will prevail.
Socialist  firms--completely  dependent  on carrot  incentives  and  severely
constrained  in  their  use--have  failed  to institute  adequate  work incentives
for  several  reasons:
(1) Historically,  profit-sharing  and  bonus  schemes  have  proved  ineffective.
First,  interfirm  redistribution  (the  heavy  taxation  of  profitable  firms  and
the  subsidization  of  workers  in financially  weak firms)  has severely  dampened
24/  See  Blinder  (1990)  for  a recent  review  of the  literature.24
the  incentive  effect  of profit-sharing.  Second,  distorted  relative  prices  and
bureaucratic  price  regulation  separated  a firm's  financial  results  and
performance,  decreasing  the  importance  of improving  productivity  to increase
firm  revenue. Third,  bonus  schemes  suffer  from  such  shortcomings  as the
failure  to subject  all  firms  to the  same  incentives,  the  differential
treatment  of  material  and  labor  inputs,  and  the  complex,  theoretically  weak
basis  for  wage regulation  (necessitated  by second-best  considerations).
Fourth,  without  the  threat  of dismissal,  profit-sharing  is  weakened  as a
motivational  device. The  inability  to exclude  workers  may  prevent  the
homogeneity  needed  for  social  enforcement  mechanisms  such  as  peer  pressure  to
be effective.
(2)  Egalitarianism  through  interfirm  redistribution  is reinforced  through
centrally  imposed  skill-exertion  matrices  (which  largely  determine  the
relative  earnings  of individual  workers  in  a firm). This  produces  a  more
compressed  wags structure  than  in capitalist  countrles.
(3)  Ideological  criteria  dominate  in  hiring,  and  internal  labor  markets  are
ineffective.  Simatupang  (1982)  describes  the  frustration  and  discontent  of
highly  qualified  (particularly  young)  employees  because  of the  incongruity
between  their  professional  aspirations  and  the  limited  possibilities  for
fulfilling  them.
Inefficient  allocation  of labor
Another  manifestation  of the  full-employment  syndrome  is the  inefficient
allocation  of labor. Simatupang  (1982)  reports  that,  because  of enterprises'
hoarding  tendencies,  the  proportion  of employees  with  higher  technical
education  in  the  nonagricultural  sector  is  much higher  in  Poland  (1.96
percent)  than  in  many  Western  countries  (ranging  from  0.71  percent  in  France25
to  0.40  percent  in  West Germany). Moreover,  to in  rease  wages  under
particular  wage regulation  schemes,  enterprises  tend  to  hire  workers  whose
base  wages  are  below  the  firm  average  (Marrese  1981)  or (in  Poland)  relatively
unskilled  workers.
In general,  in so constrained  a labor  market,  labor  mobility,  although
voluntary,  may not  improve  the  efficiency  of labor  allocation. Employment
subsidies  create  a  wedge  between  the  wage  paid to  workers  and  their  value
marginal  product. The  wage does  not  reflect  the  opportunity  costs  of labor  so
it does  not send  the  right  signals  for  labor  allocation  economywide. If  value
marginal  product  in firm  A does  not  equal  value  marginal  product  in firm  B,
welfare  could  be increased  by reallocating  labor  from  the  less  productive  to
the  more productive  use.  But  if  both firms  pay  the  same  wage rate,  workers
themselves  have  no incentive  to change  employers  and  the  evidence  shows  that
alternative  allocative  mechanisms,  such  as direct  administrative  measures,  are
ineffective.
The authorities  in  socialist  co.intries  often  complain  about  excessive
labor  turnover,  which  allegedly  ircerrupt  production,  add  to the  costs  of
recruiting,  training,  and  so forth. (Various  economic  and  administrative
measures  taken  to reduce  turnover  have  apparently  failed.) Viewed  from  the
commanding  heights  of the  economy,  no doubt  it is  hard to  understand  workers'
job  changes  even  if they  increase  productivity.  And the  discontent  of the
authorities  with  high turnover  may  be economically  justified: since  wages  in
SEs  do not  reflect  the  relative  scarcity  of different  types  of labor,  labor
turnover  might indeed  bring  about  only  individual  gains  (through
redistribution),  with no social  gain.26
One  of the  most drastic  consequences  of job  security  i,.  the  "perverse"
allocation  of resources--comprising  both  the  cost  of inputs  and  the
opportunity  cost  of factors  of  production--the  coet  of  maintaining  inefficient
production. Such  costs  can  be  much  higher  than  the  mere cost  of subsidizing
employment.
The  tendency  toward  wage drift
Socialist  economies  currently  lack  an impersonal  mechanism  to
countervail  the  tendency  toward  wage increases. If the  distribution  of income
in the  firms  were 'Left  uncontrolled  by higher  authorities,  the  resulting  wage
drift  would  probably  lead  to two  types  of  macroeconomic  unbalance. First,  the
economy's  savings  rate  would  drop (since  at  present  there  are  few
opportunities  for individuals  to invest  productively).  Second,  because  of
accommodating  monetary  policy  and  firms'  ability  to resort  to  money
substitutes  (increasing  the  velocity  of  money),  an  excess  aggregate  demand
would  emerge,  producing  open  or repressed  inflation  (depending  on the  price
regime).
One  can  argue  that  the  ill-defined  structure  of the  property  rights
underlies  macroeconomic  imbalances  in  SEs.  For  one  thing,  capital  assets  in
SEs  are state  owned. This  means  that  investments  the  firm  makes  from  its  own
resources  are  nonrecoverable,  so  workers  have  no claims--individually  or
collectively--to  the  firm's  business  fund  when they  separate  from  the  firm.
That  results  in  the  well-known  "horizon  problem"  described  in the  literature
on self-management  (see  Furobotn  and  Pejovich  1970,  or Jensen  and  Meckling
1979): unable  to  recover  their  original  investment  the  workers  choose  to  work
with relatively  little  capital. (In  reality  socialist  firms  mostly  get27
external  financing  for  their  investments,  so there  is  no evidence  of a  horizon
problem.)
The  discretionary  nature  of property  rights  in SEs (another  facet  of
state  paternalism)  also  contributes  to the  phenomenon  of  wage drift. Under
the  prevailing  structure  of  political  power  in SEs,  the  state  can  redistribute
significant  portions  of GNP  through  (1)  ad hoc  interventions  (taxation  or
subsidization)  into  the  distribution  of income  at the firm  level,  and (2)
(mis)use  of the financial  system. Unprofitable  firms  get subsidies  (such  as
straight  subsidies,  concessionary  crediting,  and  tax  waivers)  that  are  in turn
converted  into  components  of demand. But  this  massive  redistribution  of
income  is  usually  only  partly  financed  by fiscal  revenues. Yugoslavia  and,
more  recently,  Hungary  and  Poland,  rely  heavily  on  monetary  expansion  to
finance  state  interventions--with  unavoidable  inflationary  implications.
Some  believe  that  fiscal  imbalances  cannot  account  for  Yugoslavia's
notorious  macroeconomic  instability,  because  Yugoslavia  always  has  a balanced
budget. Rocha (1990)  argues  that  the  impression  of a balanced  public  sector
budget  is false--that  there  is a  hidden  but  real  deficit  of significant
proportions. This  deficit  consists  mainly  of implicit  subsidies  to
enterprises  (1)  by providing  domestic  credits  at highly  negative  real interest
rates,  and (2)  thr3ugh  a foreign  exchange  insurance  scheme  that  allows
enterprises  that take  out  foreign  loans  to shift  the repayment  of their  debt
onto  the shoulders  of commercial  banks  or the  central  bank,  financed  by the
inflation  tax.  (See  also  Bole  and  Gaspari  1989.)
Bole and  Gaspari  (1989)  show  that  other  factors  also  contribute  to
inflation  in  Yugoslavia--especially  the  inconsistent,  often  changing  economic
policy  itself. Sporadic  price  controls  in particular  have  blocked  relative28
price  adjustments,  so  that  exchange-rate  adjustments  have influenced  only  the
general  prices  without  affecting  the  structure  of  production. Their  very
repetitiousness  shows  the  ineffectiveness  of  price  controls,  escalates
targeted  price  increases  when the  price  freeze  is lifted,  and  thus  increases
inflationary  expectations.  Furthermore,  Bole  and  Gaspari  find  that  wage and
monetary  policy,  and  the  introduction  of  the  new  accounting  principles  in
1987,  generate  significant  inflation--the  latter  by increasing  the  economy's
"degree  of indexation."
Another  factor  helps  explain  the  recent  escalation  of inflation  in
Poland,  Hungary,  and  Yugoslavia: the  external  imbalance  that  necessitates  an
exchange-rate  adjustment.  When  workers  can  fight  price  increases  by raising
their  wages,  one  mechanism  to reduce  wages (the  so-called  Pazos-Simonsen
mechanism)  is to permanently  increase  the  rate  of inflation. This  points  to
the  presence  of the  other,  traditionally  recognized  character  of inflation  in
socialist  countries: cost-push  inflation. But it is important  to realize
that inflation  in  SEs  has  not  been  fueled  only  by  mounting  costs--that  is,  has
not  been  only  a cost-push  character. So long  as these  economies  do not
address  the fundamental  imbalances  associated  with the  subsidization  of
enterprises  (particularly  nonviable  ones),  there  is  no chance  for  permanent
stabilization.
Interaction  between  the  first  and  second  economies
Because  of restrictions  on ownership  and  the  labor  market,  a "second
economy"  has  emerged  in SEs.  This  economic  sector  is usually  defined  as
comprising  all  activities  that  are  not  performed  in the  state/social  sector--
not  just  the  illegal  activities  that  comprise  the  "underground"  sector  of
market  economies.29
The second  economy  includes  both  formal  and  informal  activities.  Among
formal  ones (officially  licensed  to  conduct  business  and  therefore  liable  to
taxes),  the  most important  are  crafts,  retail  trade,  residential  construction,
and  catering  (for  such  countries  as  Hungary,  Poland,  and  Yugoslavia). The
business  is usually  performed  by the  owner  alone,  sometimes  with the  help  of
family  members  or a few  hired  employees  (in  Yugoslavia,  only  half the  owners
employ  one  hired  employee,  on average).
The informal  part  of the  second  economy  consists  of (1)  legal  economic
activities  that  do  not  require  Incorporation;  (2)  legal  economic  activities
performed  in a  way that  violates  laws  or regulations  (for  example,  running  the
business  without  a license  to avoid  paying  taxes,  or performing  a second-
economy  activity  during  regular  working  hours  or on sick  leave,  or  with
material  and  equipment  stolen  from  the  first  economy);  and (3)  unlawful
activities. Important  activities  include  household  farming  and  residential
housing,  repair,  and  maintenance.
Most activities  in the  second  economy  are  probably  carried  out  in the
informal  private  sector. For  Hungary  in 1984,  Kornai  (1986a)  estimates  that
about  one-third  of  working  hours  are  spent  in  the  second  economy,  and  that  the
informal  private  sector  might  add  20 percent  or more  to official  GDP.  For
Yugoslavia,  Kukar  (1988)  finds  the  scale  of second  economy  activities
increasing  steadily  from  the 1960s  on,  amounting  to between  16  and  25 percent
of GNP in 1981.
The second  economy  is,  in  many  ways,  a rational  response  to the
constraints  imposed  on economic  activities  in  the "socialist"  sector. Several
factors  encourage  participation  in the  second  economy: the  possibility  of
avoiding  taxes,  the internalization  of the  externalities  connected  with30
providing  effort,  the  narrow  range  of officially  sanctioned  wage
differentials,  and  often  the  dictation  of high  prices  by an inefficient  and
unresponsive  social  sector. And several  factors  discourage  participation  in
the  second  economy: the  stability  of income,  relat  -7ely  low  level  of effort,
and significant  fringe  benefits  attached  to employment  in the  social  sector.
(Many  fringe  benefits,  such  as health  insurance,  cover  family  members,  so at
least  one  family  member  usually  holds  a "first  economy';  job.)
A curious  symbiosis  develops  between  firm  management  and  dual-status
workers (those  participating  in  both economies).  The firm  tolerates  below-
average  efforts  by dual  workers  yet  benefits  from  employing  such  workers
because  their  dismissal  would  only  aggravate  the  shortage  of labor  (Kertesi
and Sziraczki  1985).
The existence  of the  second  economy  allows  workers  to  work  beyond  the
rigidly  set  work  hours  of the  first  economy. Moreover,  the  laxity  of  work
discipline  helps  reduce  the  hours  worked  ("stolen  hours"). Gaddy  (1990)
argues  persuasively  that  the  distribution  of labor  supply  resembles  that  found
in the  market  economy.
4.  POLICY  IMPLICATIONS  AND RESEARCH  ISSUES
The foregoing  description  of the  features  and  functioning  of the  labor
market  in  East  European  countries  is  a useful  starting  point  for  talking  about
the  design  of labor  market  policies  during  the  transition  to a  market  economy
--particularly  since  labor  market  adjusts  notoriously  slowly,  and  will
probably  persist  in old  patterns  for  some  time.  Like  most economists
analyzing  this  economic  transition--a  transition  of unprecedented  magnitude--
I hesitate  to offer  detailed  prescriptions  and  solutions  for  economic  policy.31
Rather, I identify crucial labor  market policy issues, draw some tentative
conclusions, discuss questions policymakers must face during the transition,
and identify important research issues.
Mobility and absorption of labor
A key feature of the transition  will be redundant labor and, almost
certainly, unemployment of significant proportions together with labor
shortages for certain skills.  A major challenge for these economies will be
to achieve a massive reallocation of labor (among firms, industries,
occupations, and even regions) at the least social cost.  What that cost  will
be depends on the success of the reform generally and the appropriateness of
the labor market and social protection policies in particular.
"Active" labor  market policies will be particularly important during the
transition.  Unemployment  benefit  schemes  are  designed  primarily  to provide
income  support  to  unemployed  workers,  so they  only  alleviate  the  painfulness
of involuntary  unemployment.  Market  economies  in the  developed  countries  have
come  to recognize  that  income  support  schemes  are  ineffective  at reducing
unemployment.  Active  labor  market  policies  are  needed--those  that enhance
labor  mobility  and  increase  labor  absorption,  thus  helping  to  reintegrate
unemployed  workers  into  the  labor  market. To achieve  this,  SEs  must
significantly  improve  and  expand  their  facilities  for  training  and  retraining
workers,  and  employ  other,  more  heterodox  labor  market  policies  (such  as
assisting  small  businesses,  improving  the  educational  system,  linking
universities  with businesses,  and  helping  with technology  transfer).
Appropriate  income  support  policies  must complement  active  labor  market
policies. Most SEs  have  overgenerous  income  support  programs. Under  certain
circumstances,  Yugoslav  workers  are  guaranteed  income  for  24  months  after32
being laid off (Crosslin 1990).  And Yugoslav legislation distinguishes
between "economically" and technologically" redundant  workers  (with
significant implications for income support), a distinction that is completely
arbitrary  and  thus  unwarranted.
The inefficient housing market in SEs significantly deters labor
mobility.  Compared  with the rate of housing turnover in market economies (15
to 20 percent) the rate of housing turnover in SEs (1  percent in Poland, for
example)  is inefficiently  low (Renaud  1990). Historically,  housing  has  a low
priority  in government  investments  so  there  is  a huge  shortage  of dwellings.
(In  major  Polish  cities,  for  example,  there  are  waiting  lists  for  housing  of
15  or  more  years.) Among  other  things,  the  housing  shortage  is caused  by  high
construction  costs  (which  contribute  to  the  extremely  high ratio  between  the
price  of  housing  and  personal  earnings),  and  artificially  low  rents  for  state-
owned  apartments.  The latter  contributes  to the  inefficient  use of dwellings
and  tends  to reduce  the  housing  supply  by encouraging  inadequate  maintenance-
-typically,  rent  revenues  cover  only  about  25 to 50  percent  of  maintenance
costs! The  more important  type  of housing  subsidy  has  been concessionary
credits  for  the  purchase  of apartments  or building  materials.
Housing  reform  should  be oriented  in  the  following  way:  Socially  owned
apartments  should  be privatized,  and  owners'  rights  should  be respected  no
less  than  tenants'  rights. This  would  mobilize  and  channel  savings  into
residential  construction,  and  provide  incentives  for  the  maintenance  of
existing  housing  stock. At the  same  time,  the  financial  system  should  be
reformed: rents  on socially  owned  apartments  should  be increased  and,  in
general,  the  regressive  subsidization  of housing  should  end,  to  be replaced  by
housing allowances for targeted groups (young or poor families).  On the33
supply  side,  measures  should  be taken  to  reduce  the  high  production  costs  of
housing--for  example,  by fostering  competition  among  construction  companies,
restructuring  urban  planning,  and  facilitating  access  to land  sites.
Wage  and  employment policies
The  crucial  question  about  the  full  employment  syndrome  is  whether  the
SEs  can  impose  and  sustain  financial  discipline  in the  long  run (applying
strict  economic  criteria  in financial  intermediation--in  particular,  cutting
financial  aid  to ailing  firms). In other  words,  can  they  eliminate
(employment)  subsidies? 25 I have  argued  that  job  security  and  the  resulting
redundant  employment  have  not  been so  much an official  goal  of the  reforming
SEs,  as  they  have  been  a  way to preserve  the  status  quo (and  hence  the
privileged  position  of  bureaucrats  and  managers). To impose  and  sustain
financial  discipline  (the  "hard  budget  constraint")  is,  therefore,  not only  a
matter  of top  government  officials  being  willing  to impose  it--if  the system
remains  unchanged. Rather,  the  conditions  for  imposing  lasting  financial
discipline  are  much  more demanding,  and  include: transparent  (individual)
property  rights,  an unselective  and  transparent  fiscal  system,  and  a
multiparty  political  system  (to  provide  checks  and  balances  for  the ruling
party  and  thus  contain  its  ability  to  redistribute--see  Vodopivec  (1990c). 26
Add this  important  caveat: it  is crucially  important  to end  the  full-
employment  syndrome,  but shock  therapy  in  the  form  of cutting  all  enterprise
25/  With the  recent  substantial  reduction  of price  controls,  a significant
source  of redistribution  (one  that is difficult  to measure)  has been to
a large  extent  eliminated.
26/  To achieve  financial  discipline  in  the  short  run,  these  conditions  may  be
replaced/complemented,  to some  extent,  by government  commitment  to stop
subsidies,  backed  by the support  of international  agencies  (IMF,  World
Bank) and accompanied  by an appropriate  safety  net to cope with the
resulting  unemployment.34
subsidies  overnight  is  hardly  advisable. In an economy  where  so  many
parameters  deviate  from  their  likely  long-term  values,  many potentially  viable
producers  could  be hurt  as  well.  It is  much  more desirable  to gradually  phase
subsidies  out--perhaps  over  two  to four  years,  as proposed  by Svejnar  (1990).
Alternatively,  Murrell (1990)  advocates  gradual  transition  through  the  so-
called  dual  economy.
The area  of industrial  relations  is also  extremely  important. The SEs'
hasty  reversion  from  socialist  goals  and  principles  to those  of capitalist,
market-oriented  economies  leaves  unanswered  many  question-  not only  about  the
transition  period  but also  about  the  much less  ambiguously  defined  goal  of
transition  (full-fledged  capitalism).  An important  but  unsatisfactorily
explored  issue  is  worker  participation  (encompassing  decisionmaking,  profit-
sharing,  and  ownership).  For instance,  the  evidence  shows  that  a conventional
wage system,  in  which  wages (a  salary)  are  unrelated  to performance,  is
inefficient--that  is,  that  workers  in  firms  that  allow  for  profit-sharing  and
possibly  other  forms  of  worker  participation  are  more  productive  (Blinder
1990). Not  surprisingly,  Blinder  (p.  2) argues  that  "a society  starting  over
again  to design  a pay  system  to encourage  high  productivity  would  be  most
unlikely  to choose  the  conventional  wage system,"  a remark  that  undoubtedly
applies  fully  to the  postsocialist  economies.
Economic  reasons  apart,  worker  participation  is likely  to be a feature
of SE reform  for  political  reasons. Workers  who have  already  been  granted  the
right  to participate  in ownership  and  control  of a firm in  the  past,  if  only
on paper,  will probably  want to retain  those  rights  in the future  (hence
workers'  resentment  of privatization).35
A related  problem  is job  security. Recent  research  indicates  that  there
need  not  necessarily  be a tradeoff  between  the  efficiency  of adjustment  and
job security. Using  measures  other  than  layoffs,  German  firms  have succeeded,
over  12  to 18  months,  in  adjusting  their  employment  as  much as,  and  sometimes
more than,  U.S. firms  (Abraham  and  Houseman  1988). There  are  also  arguments
for  a corporatist  wage  bargaining  structure  (the  Austrian  or Swedish  models,
say).  OECD (1987),  for  example,  reports  that "(t)he  countries  with
encompassing  bargaining  structures  have  enjoyed  better-than-average  records  of
unemployment  over  the 1970s  and  first  half  of the  eighties."
Incomes  policies  are  also  important,  at least  during  the  transition.
Such  policies  could  introduce  centralized  control  through  the  back  door,  but
it seems  safe  to assume  that--at  least  in the  near future  and for  sectors
unaffected  by changes  in  ownership--some  kind of  wage regulation  will be
needed. Given  the  unfavorable  record  of  past  wage regulation,  however,  many
questions  remain  unresolved:  which  authority  should  be responsible  for
formulating  and  enforcing  wage regulation?  What  kinds  of control  damage
individual  productivity  least? Can  wage regulation  prevent  the  differences  in
firms'  financial  performance  that  arise  from  differences  in  market  power  and
distorted  prices? Should  income  policy  be patterned  after  developed  market
economies  and  involve  targeted  economywide  wage increases,  or (probably  more
appropriately)  should  it allow  enterprise-specific  wage increases,  taking  into
account  the  current  situation,  which  is  admittedly  far  from  being  a long-term
equilibrium?
SEs  should  significantly  change  their  current  practices  on nonwage  labor
costs  and  the  taxation  of  wages.  Currently,  much  of labor  remuneration  takes
forms  other  than  wages (not  only  health  insurance  and social  security,  but36
also  the subsidy  of housing  and  vacations,  the  provision  of meals  at  work,  and
so forth). Similarly,  heavy  taxation  of labor  increases  labor-related  costs
(typically,  taxes  and  other  nonwage  labor  costs  constitute  up to one-half  of
labor  costs  in SEs).  Policy  recommendations  include: (1)  shifting  from
nonwage  to  wage payments  (among  other  things,  this  will enable  firms  to
compete  with the  so-called  second  economy)  and (2)  overhauling  the  fiscal
system,  replacing  the  present  system  (direct  taxation  of the  factors  of
production)  with a  personal  income  tax.
On the  important  issue  of  wage differentials,  some (for  example,
Flakierski  1986)  maintain  that  workers  in socialist  countries  hold strong
egalitarian  sentiments  that  could  render  attempts  to increase  wage
differentials  (particularly  within  an enterprise)  counterproductive.  More
plausible  are  arguments  that  egalitarianism  is rooted  mainly  in  opposition  to
the (semi)past  practice  or  wage setting  that  completely  blurs  the  link  between
individual  performance  and  earnings  (high  earnings  and  perquisites  are
privileges  reserved  mostly  for  the  ruling  elite). The  perception  of
inequality  has  been  sharper  because  earnings  differentials  have  been set  by
political  authorities.  As the  institutional  set-up  changes,  so  will the
limits  on "socially  unacceptable  earnings  differences,"  so a policy  of
widening  earnings  will become  productive.  Reform  will also largely  remove
another  reason  wage differentials  are  vulnerable: the  transparency  of  wage-
setting.
Research issues
Finally,  let  me discuss  some  of the  fruitful  areas  for  research  that  the
colossal  "workshop"  of today's  Eastern  Europe  offers.37
The  reallocation  of labor. The central  and  by far  the  most important
area  for  research  on labor  in  the  East  European  transition  is  the  reallocation
of labor,  which  has  already  taken  dramatic  proportions  (especially  since  these
countries  have a long  history  of full  employment).  Such  research  should  try
to answer  some  of the  following  questions: Which  groups  of  workers  are  most
at risk  of  becoming  unemployed  (for  example,  the  elderly,  disabled,  or
minorities? blue-collar  or  white-collar  workers? men or  women?)? Which
groups  of  workers  have the  best  chance  for  reemployment?  How long  does it
take  to reactivate?  What is  the  long-term  reemployment  rate? What kinds  of
jobs  do reentrants  get? How  helpful  are  the  "active"  policies  to combat
unemployment  (such  as retraining  and  assistance  to small  businesses)? Do
reentrants  move into  different  occupations,  industries,  or regions? What is
the  attitude  of the  family  and  neighbors  toward  the  unemployed? Are there  any
signs  that  unemployment  harms  health? Research  into  these  and  related  issues
would  provide  many extremely  relevant  answers  to policymakers.2'
Subsidies. Given  the  central  role subsidies  have  played  in inflating
the  demand  for  labor  in SEs,  another  important  area  of research  is subsidies
to firms  during  the  transition  period. This  topic  could  be approached  from
several  points  of  view:  (1)  the  sustainability  of cuts  in subsidies  in the
context  of the  political  economy  of stabilization  (see  for  example,  Haggard
1985),  (2)  the  impact  of redistribution  on  macroeconomic  imbalances,  (3)  the
impact  of income  redistribution  on  the  demand  for  labor  and  an assessment  of
the  labor  redundancies  that  result  from  such  inflated  demand,  and (4)  the
27/  Ham  and  Svejnar  (1990)  is  an  excellent  example  of  a  research  proposal  along
these  lines,  with  detailed  methodology.  Regrettably,  a  World  Bank (1990)
project  proposal  on labor  markets  in  Eastern  Europe,  by confining  itself
to existing  data (p.  34) and focusing  on macroeconomic  issues  (such  as
wage-price  dynamics),  ignores  the  big  story: labor  reallocation.38
impact  of income  redistribution  on  work incentives  (along  the  lines  of
Vodopivec  1989,  for  example).
L.s  for  the  possibilities  of subsidy,  Hungary  and  Yugoslavia  deserve
part:.cular  attention  because  of their  more  developed  system  of commercial
banks,  and  greater  decentralization  of  political  and  economic  decisionmaking.
The  development  of  other  SEs  will  probably  proceed  in the  same  direction,  so
it is important  to investigate  the  possibility  that  economic  decentralization
could  actually  worsen  the  economy's  ability  to return  to a  hard-budget
constraint  under  conditions  of (1)  persisting  state  or social  ownership  and
(2)  a political  system  that  lacks  adequate  checks  and  balances  (a  conclusion
that  the  Yugoslav  experience  seems  to support).
Worker  participation.  Research  on the  effects  of  worker  participation
would  also  be useful  for  policymakers.  Studying  groups  of  enterprises  that
differ  about  worker  participation,  it  would  be interesting  to empirically
investigate  the  effect  of participation  of  workers  in profit-sharing,
decisionmaking,  and  ownership  'along  the  lines  of Estrin,  Jones,  and  Svejnar
1987,  for  example),  and  to try  to  answer  such  questions  as these: Which  types
of participation  are  most effective  and  suitable  to the  environment  under
investigation?  Do they  interact  in  any  way, and  how? What forms  of
parcicipation  in decisionmaking  are  most appropriate  (workers'  participation
in the  board  of directors,  as in  German  "codetermination,"  or  more direct
involvement,  as in  worker  councils)? It  would  also  be useful  to  help
formulate  government  policy  toward  such  participation  schemes.
Failure  of  Yugoslavia's  system. Finally,  a study  of the  factors  that
have  contributed  to the  apparent  failure  of  Yugoslavia's  system  would  be
particularly  useful. It  might  seem,  for  example,  that  the  Yugoslav39
experience--produced  by a system  based,  among  other  things,  on  worker  profit-
sharing  and  decision  making 28-- contradicts  the  consensus  in the  empirical
literature  on  worker  participation  in developed  economies  (summarized  in
Blinder  1990)  that  participation  improves  productivity.  Another  explanation
for  the  Yugoslav  failure,  probably  closer  to the  truth,  is that  forces  similar
to those  in  other  SEs  were at  work,  that  had  nothing  to do  with worker
participation,  but  pushed  the  economy  and  society  into  the  current  crisis.
These  forces  have  not  been identified  or analyzed  with enough  professional
vigor.  29
28/  Hinds (1990)  is one of the  most vocal  critics  of worker  participation,
blaming  it for  the  failure  of the  Yugoslav  system.
29/  In this connection,  it  would be useful to investigate  the economic
consequences  of the mid-1970s  reform  in Yugoslavia. Tyson (1979)  and
others  have suggested  that the introduction  of Basic Organizations  of
Associated  Labor in the  mid-1970s,  by decreasing  the size of the firm,
might  have  mitigated  the  "1/n  problem"  (the  free-rider  problem  arising  in
team  production when  metering of  labor  inputs and/or  output is
imperfect/costly).  Alternatively,  the  economic  impact  of  the  reforms  might
have  been  negative  because  the  reforms  may  have  pushed  firms  into  excessive
fragmentation.40
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